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Years of Decision: An Explanation of the 1948 and 1949
Yugoslavian Conflicts
Stephanie McWhorter
Introduction

made by the Yugoslavian government. The
first decision came in 1948, the second in
1949. To Western powers both decisions
appeared to have been made to reach the
same end, i.e. to fmd favor with the
obviously stronger and more correct camp,
the West. To the Soviets, both decisions
seemingly attempted to separate, then
distance the two countries. In the process
Yugoslavia turned her back to the
Communist brotherhood and became a
hapless pawn for imperialist kings.
Both are powerful arguments, but
with a closer examination of the actual
situation, primary players, and the world
political structure of the time, a different
argument can be made.
This will be
discussed in greater detail later , but first the
fascinating story behind these two
momentous decisions must be told.

With the conclusion of World War
II, the cementing of a strong bi-polar sphere
of influence system appeared imminent.
The two dominant powers, the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, gathered their allies together,
bolstering their military, economic and
political strength. To the casual, or even
informed Western observer, the Yugoslavian
government's commitment to the Soviet
agenda seemed firm and unwavering. As
late as April 12, 1948, Yugoslavian leader
Marshal Josip Broz Tito relayed his
commitment to Stalin, detailing his party's
achievements for the communist cause and
past loyalties (Banac 1988, 117). Yet within
three months, ties between the two countries
would be strained and the Western world
shocked by an apparently irreconcilable
schism between the two strong Communist
countries.
What led to the shocking severance
of ties and Yugoslavia's subsequent
conciliatory actions toward Western powers?
On the surface it might appear that the
Yugoslavian government acted irrationally
and against all norms. Both the USSR and
Yugoslavia were Communist countries fully
dedicated to the ideals of Marx and Lenin.
Both iterated an intense hatred for the
capitalist, imperialist West. Both advocated
a world-wide Communist ideology and
brotherhood. Yet the two countries sharply
separated in 1948; one controlled the
Communist sphere of influence, the other
found acceptance in the Western camp.
This abrupt, seemingly illogical split
can be explained by examining two decisions

Historical Analysis
The Decision in 1948
On April 12, 1948 the Komunisticka
partija Jugoslavije Central Committee (the
Communist party of Yugoslavia, KPJ)
convened at the Old Palace in Belgrade's
Dedinje section (Wilson 1979, 55). The
primary purpose of the meeting was to
formulate a response to Stalin's First Letter,
a harsh correspondence containing
accusations, threats, and demands
concerning Yugoslavian loyalty, actions, and
state goals. Tito's response posited a calm,
collected reply,
emphasizing shared
ideology, equality and nationality. During
the course of meeting's discussion, Edvard
Kardelj, the second man in the Politburo,
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determined that "our party contributed quite
a few new elements to the treasury of
Marx[ism]-Len[inism].
[We made a]
contribution to the struggle against
imp[erialism] in the international arena. We
supported the USSR in a creative way"
(Banac 1988, 118).
The participants
confirmed the government's commitment to
the Communist agenda, but announced that
other considerations had to take priority. As
Tito firmly stated, "No matter how much
some of us love the land of socialism, the
USSR, he can, in no case, love his own
country less, which also is building
socialism" (Banac 1988, 118).
Stalin immediately issued his Second
Letter, accusing the Yugoslavs, and Tito
specifically, of equating the USSR with the
imperialist great powers. He ridiculed the
detailed achievements of the Yugoslavian
government and proclaimed that no
Communist government could come to
power, or presume to stay in power, without
Soviet military aid (Banac 1988, 123). He
concluded by suggesting that the Yugoslavs
present their case to the Communist
Information Bureau, the Cominform,
allowing all brother Communist states to
hear both sides of the issue (Wilson 1979,
57).
Tito and Kardelj officially responded
to Stalin's Second Letter, rejecting the
possibility of any Cominform arbitration.
They charged the USSR with assuring the
conflict's outcome by lobbying other
governments. They then reaffirmed their
loyalty to socialism, the Soviet Union and
Marxism-Leninism (Banac 1988, 124).
After receiving the third letter, Stalin
and other leaders continued their attempt to
persuade the Yugoslavs to attend the
Cominform meeting. These efforts failed.
When the official invitation arrived on June
10, 1948, Tito informed Cominform
representatives that no Yugoslavian
delegation would be present (Banac 1988,

125).
By choosing to not participate in this
forum, Tito permitted several things to
happen. First, by not allowing any type of
official representation, the other Communist
leaders were able to condemn all his actions,
unilaterally. Their rationale assumed that
since Tito chose not to defend his country's
actions, he was obviously guilty of all Soviet
charges, and was therefore a traitor to the
Communist party.
Second, his refusal to participate in
an official Communist forum cast
considerable doubts about his sincerity in the
Communist cause. The Communist camp
quickly doubted his faithfulness and loyalty
while the Western powers eagerly began
courting Yugoslavia as a prospective ally.
This obvious breach in the balance of power
further destabilized the international system
temporarily while Yugoslavia attempted to
resituate itself in the world's structure.
Third, Yugoslavia's future course of
action appeared precarious. By snubbing,
insulting, and even openly opposing the
Soviet Union, any attempts at future
reconciliation would be extremely difficult,
and conceivably achieved only through many
conciliatory gestures, economic sacrifices,
and political sacrifices. After beginning
negotiations for a possible alignment with
the West, Yugoslavia set itself in a
dangerous position. The Soviet Union was
a formidable foe, even for the United States.
What chances could a small, militarily
insignificant country have against a nuclearendowed superpower?
During the Cominform,
representatives from the other Communist
governments formulated the Cominform
Resolution. On June 28, 1948 the Western
world received a tremendous shock when
made aware of the conflict between two
Communist governments. The accusations
listed in the Resolution included antiSovietism, practical and ideological errors,
-28-
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party departures from Leninist theory, a lack
of intra-party democracy, and repeated
refusals to accept criticism (Banac 1988,
125). The most serious charge, made in
point eight, held that KPJ leaders "have
placed themselves in opposition to the
Communist parties within the Information
Bureau, have taken the road of seceding
from the united socialist from against
imperialism, betraying the cause of
international solidarity of the working
people, and have taken a nationalist
position" (Banac 1988, 125).
The Resolution issued a blanket
condemnation, stating "The Information
Bureau considers that, in view of all this,
the KPJ CC has excluded itself and the KPJ
from the family of fraternal Communist
parties, the united Communist front, and
consequently is outside the ranks of the
InformationBureau" (Banac 1988,125-126).
Needless to say, the international
system changed dramatically, jolted from a
relatively stable multipolar system into
further chaos. Suddenly there was a small,
but significant threat to one superpower's
preeminence, which stunned both Western
and Communist leaders.

Governor by the Security Council of the
U.N. The Soviets had hoped to eventually
render this plan unworkable, but even
through 1949, an Anglo-American military
occupation force continued to control the
area under the FTT, along with increasing
Italian participation (Wilson 1979, 85).
On 20 March 1949, to help the
Italian Christian Democrat party in a crucial
election, the US, British and French
governments addressed a declaration to the
Soviet and Yugoslav governments proposing
that the whole FTT be given back to Italy
(Wilson 1979, 85).
Tito received the
request; he found himself forced to follow
either Soviet or Western demands.
This Tripartite Declaration pushed
the Yugoslav leaders into a precarious
position. Their strained diplomatic relations
with the USSR forced them to realize that
should they agree to the Declaration, their
agreement might become a serious policy
commitment to the West. Tito realized that
by deciding to prioritize national interests
above the Communist system of states, he
would completely alienate the Soviet Union.
Even with this realization, he decided that
the best course of action would be to
gradually change camps, easing out of the
Communist structure into the Western camp,
while optimizing Yugoslavia's current and
potential position for Western aid.
The actual implementation of all
points in the Declaration constituted a long,
tedious series of diplomatic, economic and
political maneuvers.
The exchange
concluded in October 1954 with the Italians
receiving full control of the entire territory;
Tito privately expressed great satisfaction
with the outcome. The whole arrangement
had been reached without Soviet
participation or objection, Tito had
demonstrated he was ready to stand up to
his Western protectors for Yugoslavian
national interests, and he had safeguarded
Yugoslavia against any further effective

The Decision in 1949
After almost one year of tense
relations, the Yugoslavian government
indicated its future direction with its action
in a small area belonging to Italy. This
decision further defined Tito's split with
Stalin, and caused the Western powers to
believe that soon Yugoslavia would be
pursuing their agenda.
At the Paris Peace negotiations of
1946, the Yugoslavs had demanded the port
and hinterland of Trieste, a demand
resulting primarily from Soviet pressures.
Under that Paris Peace Treaty in 1946, a
Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) was
constituted, to be administered by a
-29-
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claim by the Italians (Wilson 1979, 90-91).
This historical recitation provides
interesting details, but does not explain any
of the reasons for the two implemented
decisions. To fully understand the reasons
for the two nations' split, other factors must
be considered. Through detailed analyses of
the leadership and governmental structure,
as perceived by the international community,
domestic opposition, and systemic
influences, the two decisions are better
understood on three other levels.
Ultimately, however, an integrative attempt
to combine the most important influences
from all three areas will explain the
decisions from one integrated level.

of the actors and the arena must be
intertwined.
To effectively analyze the
situation, Tito and the governmental
framework will be accorded primary
attention, with minor emphasis on Kardelj
and Djilas. The latter two actors' roles
should not be considered subordinate to
Tito's; each actor contributed greatly to the
process.
Josip Broz-Tito
Thus the CPY was able, immediately
after the liberation, to carry out the second
highly important and difficult task: to
complete the organization of new Yugoslavia
as a state, but as a state of a new type-a
true people's democracy, founded upon
federal principles, with full equality for all
the peoples of Yugoslavia. (Tito 1983, 121)
So proclaimed Tito in June of 1948. But
who was this curiously charismatic leader?
Who was the great nationalistic statesman
who challenged Stalin, and lived to see the
rise and fall of both Stalin and his doctrine?
Josip Broz-Tito, the son of CroatianSlovenian peasants, was born in 1892. He
spent his first fifteen years in Kumrovec, an
inconsequential Croatian village in the
Austro-Hungarian empire. For the next
three years he worked as a locksmith's
apprentice until becoming a full-time
Communist organizer. Tito spent the next
six years wandering throughout the Empire,
until 1913 when the Austrian Army
demanded he fulfill his two year military
commitment. During World War I, he
gained the rank of a non-commissioned
officer and fought with honor until he was
captured by the Russians in 1916. He spent
the next year in a Russian hospital, 500
miles east of Moscow. While in Russia, he
became well versed in the Communist
movement and its avowed hatred for all
capitalistic, imperialistic powers.l After
returning to Veliko Trojstvo, a Croatian

Leadership and Governmental Structure

When examining Yugoslavia's break
with the Soviet Union and her subsequent
conciliatory actions towards the West,
including the voluntary relinquishment of
Trieste, the prominence of two
fundamentally important national actors
arises: the players and their forum, the
Yugoslavian governmental structure. The
international system viewed these two actors
as the dominant policy makers, and
discounted the possibility of internal
conflicts.
Thus, from the international
perspective, only the leadership and
governmental structure influenced national
foreign policy.
The primary national actors came
from two opposing, yet cooperating,
ideological groups, namely the "theoretical"
group, led by Edvard Kardelj, Milovan
Djilas, Boris Kidric, and Vladimir Bakaric,
and the "pragmatic" group, led by Tito and
Alexander-Leka Rankovic (Djilas 1980, 3334). Tito occupied the dominant role, but
Kardelj and Djilas also played significant
roles in the decision-making process.
To better understand the processes of
1948 and 1949, the explanation and analysis
-30-
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village, he became heavily involved with
local Communist politics.
He moved
through the ranks, from the local, through
the regional, and finally into the national
level. Tito won membership in the Central
Committee of the CPY in 1934. After a
1937 party purge (ordered by Stalin), he
became secretary general (Djilas 1980, 27).
Throughout the war he continued to lead the
Communist party, playing a dominant role
in the Partisan military resistance group
(Djilas 1991, 92). In November 1943, Tito
convened the second meeting of the
Antifasisticko vece narodnog oslobodjenja
Jugoslavije - AVNOJ (Antifascist Council
for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia),
a committee of communist and
noncommunist Partisan representatives
which acted as a Partisan political umbrella
organization. This session built the basis for
the postwar government of Yugoslavia,
mandating four decisions:
1.

The country would be reconstituted
on a federal basis.

2.

A national committee to act as a
temporary government was elected.

3.

Tito was name marshal and prime
minister of Yugoslavia.

4.

A declaration forbidding King Petar,
the pre-war head of state, to return
to the country until a popular
referendum had been held on the
status of the monarchy was issued.
(Wilson 1979, 29)

been unable to inform Stalin of the session
before the fact), he had no choice but to
support his Western allies, which translated
into public support for Tito's power.
The communist party, headed by
Tito, emerged from the war as the only
viable Yugoslav leadership. A detail which
seemed inconsequential at the time, but
would later manifest tremendous
ramifications, was the lack of major Soviet
support and backing during the Partisans'
victory over Nazi Germany (Carter 1990,
25).2
On March 7, 1945 a single
provisional Yugoslav government
commenced with Tito as prime minister and
war minister. On November 29, 1945 a
newly elected constituent assembly dissolved
the monarchy and established the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 3 Two
months later a Soviet-style constitution
which provided for a federation of six
republics under a strong central government
was adopted (Rusinow 1979, 16-17).
The constitution established a
"rubber-stamp" Federal Assembly and a
presidential council to administer the federal
government. The economy was officially
centralized, but in actuality, the free market
system incorporated governmental controls.
Tito headed the party, government and
armed forces.
His party functionaries
oversaw the industries and supervised
republic and local officials (Rusinow 1977,
16-17).
As a result of the new
governmental framework,
Tito held
uncontested control over the government,
the Communist party, and the allegiance of
the Yugoslav people.
The Yugoslav government remained
essentially the same from 1948 to 1954.
The major players remained constant,
although a much more concrete ideological
split between the theoretical and pragmatic
group increased as the years progressed.
The actors functioned within the constraints
of the governmental framework. During the

The committee received full Western
support for all four decisions primarily
because the Western Allies believed the
Partisans were the only Yugoslav resistance
group opposing the Germans (Carter 1990,
23). Although Stalin was enraged by the
committee's actions (Tito had conveniently
-31-
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He was not a profound military strategist,
but his practical experiences gave him
greater insight into the overall game of war.
He accepted the horrors of war, the realities
of army life, both as an officer and a
"grunt," and the importance of the military
organization. Because he knew the army
from a common soldier's view, he
recognized the importance of an integrated
officer corp. During the Fourth Offensive
of 1943, he personally carried out the
regrouping of troops that secured the rescue
of the injured and a German defeat at Vilica
Guvno (Djilas 1980, 12-13 and 24). His
actions commanded the respect of his men.
He never passively oversaw any conflict, but
rather he actively pursued means to achieve
his desired end. His many experiences
developed a refined institutional response to
crises which would serve him well, time and
time again.
Although his experiences taught him
poise, self-containment, and a controlled
leadership style, he often became fretful,
easily agitated and would suddenly display
expressions of intimacy and warmth towards
his closest and most trusted comrades,
especially during extremely stressful
A bit of
conflicts (Djilas 1980, 31).
personal history and informal psychoanalysis
can help explain Tito's curious character
dichotomy.
During Tito' s time as a laborer, he
often operated machines. While working as
a mechanic, he sliced off the tip of his left
hand's index finger (Djilas 1980, 8). This
lifelong mutilation served as a constant
physical reminder of his humble origins and
caused him to retain a strong mental imprint
of his weaknesses. He aligned himself with
the laboring class in much of his rhetoric,
yet his latter lifestyle, which he constantly
apologized for, was modeled after the
flamboyant Latin American dictators (Djilas
1985, 61-62).6
This inherent conflict
between the shame he felt for his origins,

early months of 1948, the actors worked
within very strict limits, subordinating their
actions to the parameters of each specific
role. However, during the critical months
of the 1948 decision-making process and
then subsequent processes (including the
process involving Trieste), each actor
redefined his role, expanding his power
base, and created new parameters for future
decision making. 4
As a leader, Tito was a curious
enigma. He came from a decidedly humble
background to become one of the most
respected statesmen of the twentieth century.
Yet he was not always the poised, selfcontrolled politician who calmly opposed
Stalin. Often times he acted rashly, causing
near disaster and chaos. 5 His actions
followed no apparent consistency. Why did
this man behave so inexplicably?
Tito succeeded in grasping and
retaining political control because he was a
gifted political performer. He lacked the
education of an academic or military
strategist. His knowledge was superficial,
He
even his knowledge of Marxism.
studied the major works of Marx, Engels,
Lenin, and Stalin, but was by no accounts a
masterful theorist himself. His ability to
quickly and somewhat accurately learn new
languages aided him enormously, as he was
able to directly communicate with the
Russian, German, American, English, and
French governments. He was also able to
communicate with the various ethnic groups
of Yugoslav directly, in their own language,
although he often made serious grammatical
mistakes (Djilas 1980, 10). However, each
different ethnic group undoubtedly
recognized his tremendous desire for
acceptance and equality, manifested through
his willingness to communicate in their
language.
Tito's experiences in World War I
served as his basis for future military
leadership during the resistance movement.
-32-
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his pro-proletariate rhetoric, his lavish
lifestyle, and obvious embarrassment for his
material wealth, played heavily into Tito's
psyche, especially during intensely stressful
situations.
Even with the brief account of Tito
as a man, one cannot fully comprehend his
power unless his position within the
governmental framework is examined. As
the Partisan leader, Tito demanded near
dictatorship control (Beloff 1985, 61-62).
Since the war time setting accorded him
such control, his influence over the AVNOJ
can be accepted as significant. The AVNOJ
set the basis for the post-war government,
and a natural manifestation of Tito's war
power was his control over the post-war
government.
A transitional period between war
and peace always allows greater latitude for
a country's dominant leadership.
The
Communist party, the only viable contenders
for power, granted Tito almost unlimited
latitude for his policies and politics. Kardelj
and Djilas offered ideological opposition,
which eventually culminated in a public split
between Tito and Djilas, but did not offer
public dissent during the early post-war
years (Lustig 1989, 101). Tito was thus
able to easily move into the primary
decision-making role of a legitimate
government, with both Soviet and the
Western Allies' approval. With Stalin's
seemingly staunch support, and the Allies'
temporary approval, Tito moved quickly to
cement his dominance and build a strong
power basis.
In 1947 the establishment of the
Cominform (Communist Information
Bureau) in Belgrade further strengthened the
image that Yugoslavia was the strongest
Soviet ally in Eastern Europe. This image
was far from the truth since Stalin's primary
motivation behind the creation was to
increase the ability to manipulate the
political, military, and economic sectors of

Eastern Europe to benefit the Soviet Union
(Banac 1988, 26-7). Stalin's disapproval for
greater Yugoslav independence created
hidden resentment between the two
countries, causing fledgling tensions which
erupted in 1948. When the conflict came to
the fore, Tito was in such a preeminent
position that he was able to challenge Stalin
directly and commandingly.
Domestic Influences

Yugoslavia was officially a closed
Communist state governed by the Socialist
As the party and
Federal Republic.
government commander, Tito's power and
influence were not questioned. Even to this
day, few contest Tito's power derived from
his positions. But I question whether Tito
truly held absolute power over his country's
actions. His two right-hand men, Kardelj
and Djilas, played important roles
throughout the Communist party's history.
They were present at the party's inception,
they actively resisted the Nazis, and they
joined together to fight Stalin. In fact, both
were present when all important decisions
were made, and played important roles
during the decision making processes.
Kardelj was a very intelligent, well-educated
man. Djilas proved to be an eloquent author
of prose, poetry and political speeches.
Kardelj powered the Politburo as the secondin-command. Djilas acted as Tito's official
speech writer for many years. I believe that
these two men worked quietly behind the
scenes to control all governmental decisions,
using Tito as a front so that the international
system would credit Tito and his
government with international legitimacy.
This legitimacy translated into national
power which Djilas and Kardelj then used to
further their own specific agendas. Tito
merely played the part of a charismatic
statesman to woo the West and repudiate the
East.
-33-
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Milovan Djilas

As an educated ideologue and
theorist, Djilas better understood the
ramifications of a political separation with
Stalin. Tito viewed the proposed split as
completely political in nature, having only
ramifications for Yugoslavic economic,
military, and agriculture systems. Djilas
realized that the separation signified an
ideological split that would result in a
Western versus Eastern Communist ideology
battle. Nevertheless, Djilas was willing to
assume this new battle because he refused to
accept Stalin's response to Yugoslavic
national problems (Lustig 1989, 99-101).
As Tito's official speech writer,
Djilas held tremendous power. So long as
the overall content of a particular speech
was acceptable, details were not that
important to a very busy, non-ideologically
driven man.
Whereas for Dj ilas , an
intellectual and political theorist, ideological
details were everything (Sulzberger 1989,
80-81).
The Party Central Committee
ultimately expelled Djilas from both the
party and the government in 1958 because
he advocated a dissolution of the party
(Carter 1990, 44). Until that point, his
ideology crept into Tito's official statements.
While Stalin was pursuing policies according
to strict Communist policies, Tito began
speaking about a new brand of Communism.
This new movement was more of a
socialistic and democratic governmental
attempt to achieve Communism. Djilas
personally promoted three issues:

Milovan Djilas was born in 1911 into
a Montenegrin clan. Djilas explained his
class origins as growing up in "an
environment of peasant civil servants, more
peasant than anything else, like so many
Montenegrin intellectuals of my generation"
(Lustig 1989, 75). His father's generation
encountered a difficult question, whether
Montenegro would unite with Greater Serbia
or remain independent, whereas Djilas'
generation had to decide whether to side
with the Nazis, the Fascists, the
Communists, or the West (Lustig 1989, 76).
At the age of seven, Djilas decided he was
a Communist. 7
While attending the University in
Belgrade, he became actively involved in the
student Communist movement. He was
arrested and imprisoned after leading a
protest over student elections (Lustig 1989,
87). His activities attracted the attention of
Party leaders, including Tito, and after his
imprisonment, he was contacted and
persuaded to join the great Yugoslavic
brotherhood. During the war, he continued
working within the party, remaining a
staunch supporter of Stalinist principles and
ideologies. However, after the completion
of the war, his way of thinking changed.
Djilas envisioned a different type of world
Communist order than did Stalin.
He
wanted to pursue a more democratic,
socialistic ideology rather than accept
Stalin's doctrines (Clissold 1983, 209).
This was especially true once Stalin began
concentrating completely on growth and
development within the USSR.
Djilas
realized that should Yugoslavia follow
Stalin's plan, eventually the country would
be little more than a European colony for
mother Russia (Pavlowitch 1971, 194).
This idea was so unacceptable to Djilas that
he convinced Tito to reject Stalin's policies
and accept Western aid offers.

1. Revolution in Yugoslavia had to be
defended by more democracy.

2. Stalinist principles and policies were
incorrect.
3.
Dogmatism and opportunism were
dangerous. (Lustig 1989, 101)
The government officially banned him for
-34-
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promoting these three issues, but oddly
enough, they bear a striking resemblance to
Tito's policies and official statements made
during 1948. 8

political ideologies, it is easy to speculate
that he, as did Djilas, better understood the
ideological significance of the government's
actions (Clissold 1983, 32). After the
government decided to terminate relations
with the USSR, Kardelj fashioned
international and domestic policies. With
this in mind, it must be accepted that
Kardelj had to begin preliminary work with
the Western powers to secure support and
aid for his country. These negotiations must
have begun several months prior to the
actual separation. Once Kardelj invested so
much time and interest into a possible future
alliance with the West, he probably felt
extremely committed to secure a
Yugoslavian and Western alliance. Since he
held great influence over Tit09 , he
undoubtedly presented several national
options, focusing on and strongly
emphasizing the benefits of an alliance with
the West.
Djilas also favored this option
because of the national benefits he believed
would come with the alliance. It is not
unreasonable to believe that the two men
coordinated their efforts to persuade Tito to
accept the suggested alliance. Perhaps part
of their persuasion involved presenting
biased information, giving the West a new
validity, conceiving a new brand of ideology
which appealed to Tito, or even making
decisions within their jurisdiction which
forced Tito into a position where he could
not reconcile his government with the
USSR. 10
At this point in time, only
speculative answers can be given, but it
must be accepted that the two men greatly
influenced the nation's behavior.
As the two men were far more
involved with ordinary, day-to-day national
problems, they understood the importance of
Western aid much more than did Tito.
Kardelj helped to quickly implement land
collectivization programs in 1947, so he
must have been very concerned with the

Edvard Kardelj
Edvard Kardelj remained a staunch
supporter of Tito until his death. Because
he worked primarily behind the scenes
supporting Tito, very little is actually
documented about his influence and power.
The information known and accepted as fact
includes the following:
1. Kardelj wielded great power within the
party and the government since he remained
the highest ranking official, second only to
Tito, for several decades (Clissold 1983,
312-313).
2. Kardelj came from a humble background
and relative obscurity as a school teacher to
great political prominence during the war.
He understood well the plight of the
common man and sympathized strongly with
the laborers and other blue-collar workers
(Rusinow 1977, 8).
3. Kardelj was Tito' s intellectual superior,
he was well versed in the Communist
doctrine, and he supported the party
emphatically throughout his life (Clissold
1983, 32-33).
4.
Kardelj was Djilas' equal, both
intellectually, economically, and socially,
and the two shared a close working relatio
nship during their time together in the Party
(Djilas 1985, 162, 170).
As the second highest ranking official
in the Party, Kardelj undoubtedly advised
and guided Tito while serving in a position
similar to that of a National Security
Advisor. Since Kardelj was better versed in
-35-
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agriculture system. This system stood to
receive invaluable technology and aid once
an alliance with the West commenced.
Djilas concerned himself with the political
ideology of the country more than anything
else, and this too would gain from a
Western alliance. Since the West pursued
policies of democracy and socialism 11, the
leaders would more willingly accept Djilas's
ideology, thus crediting him greater national
legitimacy and power through acceptance of
Yugoslavic international policies.

Systemic Influences

During 1948, the international system
was a fluid, multi-polar system, although the
United States and the USSR had begun
moving into their superpower, polarized
positions. Since there were still many
countries sharing tremendous power and
influence, a smaller, dependent and
relatively powerless country would not be
secure in that type of system.
This
insecurity forced the Yugoslavian
government into a precarious position once
the events of 1948 snowballed.
As a smaller, relatively unimportant
country with a history of domination (eg.
Austro-Hungarian empire), the many
Yugoslavic ethnic groups were not unified
and did not share particularly strong ties
with other countries, with the notable
exception of the pan-Slavic sentiments
shared with USSR slavs. 14 The country
was not geo-strategically important since it
shared the Adriatic Sea with Italy. During
World War II, the Allies demonstrated their
preference when the Fascists in Italy took
precedence over German-occupied
Yugoslavia. Naturally, the West would use
Italian ports rather than Yugoslavic ports.
The rest of the country shared borders with
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria.
By 1948, the first four countries were firmly
allied with Stalin's Communist party while
Austria, an Allied-controlled country,
maintained little contact with Yugoslavia
(Beloff 1985, 148).
Before World War II, most of the
country was neither modernized nor
industrialized. After the war, the few
industrialized sectors were completely
destroyed. The agriculture system could not
support all of the country, so the
government relied heavily on economic and
agriculture aid. Yugoslavia had a

Other Domestic Forces
Although the major individual
governmental actors wielded the greatest
amount and influence, other domestic forces
helped shape the international policies. It is
well documented that a country suffering
economic hardships will reject moderate
politics in favor of wild solutions offered by
extreme political groups (Carter 1990,
21).12 The government was pressured by
anyone involved, directly or indirectly, with
the economic system. Additionally, the
ethnic disunity throughout the country forced
the government to actively pursue unifying
policies so the country would not
disintegrate. 13 The government understood
that the economy must stabilize so the entire
country would accept a specific ideology.
When Tito's party first embraced
Communism, they believed the ideology
would unify the country into an international
brotherhood, transcending all ethnic
conflicts (Djilas 1985, 32). But realities set
in after the war, and the government had to
control inflation, unemployment and food
shortages. Very quickly, the advantages of
Western aid and the mandated free market
system became attractive. Consequently,
the government replaced ideology with
economics to achieve national unification.
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other national governments had to be
considered. To facilitate my analysis, I
classified these relationships into three
categories. The following is a list of the
important countries in their respective
categories.

substantial natural resource base, but it was
not being maximized (Wilson 1979, 44-45).
National interests forced the
government to find answers within the
international system.
The Yugoslavian
government had to secure close ties with
powers that could support the country with
substantial amounts of aid. Also, once
Stalin repudiated Yugoslavia's importance to
the Communist order, the government was
forced to reassess its standing among its
Communist allies.
Yugoslavia's actions during 1948-49
can be partly explained by the systemic
influences on the nation. Maurice A. East,
a systemic expert, theorized that nations'
actions directly result from systemic
pressures exerted through the international
community (East, 143). His theories help
explain the inconceivable: why Stalin's
disciples would abandon the Communistic
world order and side with the "evil,"
capitalistic West.

1. Direct: USSR, Eastern European
Communist Governments
2. Indirect: US, England, Italy, France
3. Off-shoot: Western European
Countries, Mediterranean countries.
Direct Relationships
During the months immediately
preceding the split, Tito and his high
ranking officials were directly involved in
all intra-Comintern negotiations (Djilas
This relationship
1985, 199-204).
dominated the government's foreign policy
agenda since once they defined this
relationship, their domestic agenda would be
prioritized. That is, once they determined
that Yugoslavia would not participate in
Stalin's world Communist movement, the
government abandoned its former strict
Stalinist policies to pursue a moderate,
Yugoslavian brand of Communism. 16 The
direct relationship with other Eastern
European counties, including Hungary and
Romania, also changed.
Instead of
maintaining these countries as partners for
economic ventures and political unity ,
Yugoslavia turned its attention to Western
European Communist movements, especially
in Greece (pavlowitch 1971, 205).

Complexity
The complexity of the system
directly affects a nation's actions. Two
defining complexity characteristics to
consider are:
1. The number and type of actors.
2. The number and type of issues.
In 1948, during the months leading
to Tito's split with Stalin, the huge number
of players flooded the international system.
Since the system was still a fluid multipolar system, many more actors held
overinflated amounts of power relative to
their capabilities. 15 Since there were so
many international actors, the Yugoslavian
government had to be much more
concerned with its every action and the
subsequent consequences. Also, the type
of relationship between it and the various

Indirect Relationships
The Yugoslavian government
communicated with the West during the
critical months, but this relationship was not
a primary concern to Tito until right before
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the split. Nevertheless, these relationships
were considered important because of
possible ramifications for future alliances
and aid.
The West primarily encouraged
Tito's split by overlooking certain
governmental practices it felt were
unacceptable. Western aid was promised
and even began arriving en masse prior to
the split (Carter 1990, 27). The Allies
hoped that if they offered aid and support to
Tito, Yugoslavia would defect from Stalin's
By indirectly influencing
stronghold.
Yugoslavia through promises of future aid
and alliances, the West gave Tito the
confidence he needed to terminate relations
with Stalin.

government.
Many other topics were
discussed and negotiated, but ultimately
every issue traced its resolution back to that
one conflict. In this sense, the international
system was less complex, since ideology
replaced such things as nationalism,
ethnicity, and neo-colonialism in
importance. During 1948, several topics
discussed, including national rebuilding
plans, economic plans and future national
security, fell into this quandary. Two of
these issues had major ramifications on
Yugoslavia's course of action. The question
of occupational forces in Trieste and the
Marshall Plan forced the government to
chose between the West or the USSR. Tito
realized that by cooperating with the West
over the Trieste question, a more favorable
aid package could be secured from the
Marshall Plan. This decision required a
rejection of the Communist order in favor of
the Western capitalists. Since Tito realized
that his decision would ultimately answer the
question of where his true allegiance lay, his
decision making-process was simplified. He
could not view each decision as a single,
independent decision with an endless
possible number of consequences. Rather,
he understood each decision to be an action
which would logically lead to the next
decision. 17 Ultimately, his decisions would
culminate in a final pledge of allegiance to
either the Western or Stalinist ideology.

Off-shoot Relationships
Yugoslavia's indirect relationship
with the major Western powers dramatically
affected its off-shoot relationships once
negotiations for Western support began.
While communicating with the major
Western powers, Yugoslavia encountered
opposition over its blatant attempts to foster
and cultivate Western communist
movements. The Allies made it clear that if
Yugoslavia wanted aid, all open challenges
to Western-styled governments must stop.
Yugoslavia obliged, toning down their
insurgent activities during the next few
months (Wilson 1979, 63). Once allied with
the West, Tito's aspirations for a Western
Communist brotherhood vanished along with
the open and strong support needed by the
insurgent movements for survival. This
effectively paralyzed the movements,
abruptly halting the Western Communist
march.

Structure of Interaction
The structure of conflict during this
critical time was strictly bi-polar. The
USSR and Yugoslavia remained stringent
centers around which the conflict revolved.
This structure simplified the system
tremendously since the other international
actors were able to quickly determine their
position within the conflict. The Eastern
European countries aligned themselves with
the USSR while the West emphatically

Number and Type of Issues
The dominant issue of the day was
the Communist versus the Western style of
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supported Yugoslavia. Since these other
players did not wander from side to side,
the national leaders were able to recognize
and name their primary enemy, without
diverting important resources to fight other
insignificant players. 18

Degree of Organization
The international system was not
highly organized since it was not yet a
strict, bi-polar type.
Rather, it was
characterized by disunity and confusion.
Each national actor was attempting to find
their place within the new system. This
confusion created a looser, less threatening
environment for change since every country
expected change. Although Yugoslavia's
split with Stalin shocked the international
system, many leaders expected dramatic
changes during the transition from the postWorld War IT era into the new world order.
It is understood that countries act in their
best national interest, and for many,
Yugoslavia's defection into the Western
camp was little more than that. 19 The
obvious gains Yugoslavia stood to reap
caused many to credit the switch to reasons
for national security as opposed to
ideological reasons.
The 1948 system
willingly accepted this rationale since it was
not very rigid. Had this same defection
occurred a mere five years later, it is
conceivable that a crackdown, similar to the
response to the 1958 Hungarian rebellion,
would have happened.

Distribution of Resources
This aspect of the international
system was very important in influencing
Yugoslavia's actions. The East did not have
an efficient, well-run resource distribution
system.
Even though the USSR had
supported Yugoslavia with economic,
military, and material aid, by 1948 the
sources dried up. Since the governments had
been receiving less from the Soviets, the
leaders had begun national programs for
self-sufficiency (Beloff 1985, 147).
A
collectivization land program began in 1947
to ease food shortages. Industrialization and
modernization continued through private and
Western foreign direct investment (Beloff
1985, 149). Basically, the leaders realized
that if they were to achieve equal standing
among world leaders, they needed new
economic partners. For this reason, the
Western capitalists became attractive allies.
Evidence of the West's efficient resource
distribution was abundant throughout
Western occupied territory. Food shortages
were easing back into relative abundance.
New technology was imported from the
United States, furthering rapid
modernization. Shattered economies were
slowly being pieced together with the
Marshall Plan. When confronted with the
option of a future working relationship with
either the West or the East, it is very easy
to understand Tito's sudden acceptance of
the capitalist "pigs."

Integrative Attempts
Of the two presented decisions, the
1948 split between Yugoslavia and the
USSR is the dominant action while the 1949
Trieste problem followed as a logical
continuation.
Since no action is truly
isolated from the events leading up to and
following it, the official separation must be
considered as the central action, with the
Trieste conflict as an off-shoot of the
original problem.
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Explanations for the conflicts have
been offered at four different levels:
historical, international, domestic and
systemic.
Each explanation provides
excellent rationale for the decision, albeit
purely one-dimensional. Since all four
explanations are inseparably intertwined, the
previously offered analysis does not
sufficiently justify the conflicts' roots.
Therefore, an integrative explanation must
be presented.

not for long term purposes.
The
government will approach the international
system with a more pragmatic agenda. That
is, the government will pursue policies that
will best serve national interests at that
specific time. The domestic system will
become more stringent since the
international system will not assure long
term security. The government will have to
compensate for that security by tightening
domestic policies and restricting behavior
that could hurt the nation. This will result
in loss of diverse players moving throughout
the government. The role will replace the
individual in importance, although the
individual will still influence the role.
Because the government will be less secure,
the top few leaders will actively work to
cement their control, thereby shutting out
weaker domestic opposition. The domestic
scene will still be relatively free for those
players already within it, but those on the
government's periphery will be effectively
shut out.
3. If the international system is
chaotic, the nation will pursue isolationist
policies to withdraw from the system. The
domestic leadership will become
authoritarian so that the country can be
stabilized internally, thereby lessening the
effects of a chaotic international system.
There will be little movement within the
government since those already within the
structure will not voluntarily relinquish
power. Control of the country will be held
by only a few political elitists. The role
will replace the individual completely
because the individual will fear expulsion
from the government, and therefore will not
try to increase their power base or the
parameters of their role.

Presented Hypotheses
Based on the presented analysis and
information, I have devised three hypotheses
which explain a mid-sized country's actions.
So long as the country is a player in the
international system, the following will
apply.
1. If the international system is
rigid, the country will form strong alliances
with other nations. The country will attempt
to find, and then maintain, a strong alliance
with one of the dominant international
system's players. Once it cements a strong
alliance, the state's government will become
less rigid since the international security
level is high. This internal relaxation will
allow more movement within the
government by different players.
The
individual will be emphasized over the role.
Since this type of internal
environment is conducive to change, roles
will be re-defined according to the abilities
and energies of the individual currently
occupying that specific role. Additionally,
a domestic multi-political party system will
develop, although factions and extremists
will not flourish. The international security
affords greater national security, so the
government will not feel threatened by the
presence of several strong political parties.
2. Should the international system
be flexible, the nation's government will
pursue many alliances and friendships, but

Practical Explanation
The three presented hypotheses
explain Yugoslavia's behavior at three
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different times.
1. After 1948, the international system was
a rigid bi-polar system. 20
a. The rigidity permitted critics and
dissenting governmental players to continue
playing an active role in the government
since the government did not fear national
insecurity. The greatest example of this is
the work of Djilas. From 1948-1953, he
continually wrote critical essays,
fictionalized fact, and opinions which
charged the Party with abandoning the true
socialist ideals. The Party did not respond
officially until 1954 when he was put on
trial. Tito and Kardelj launched an intensive
attack, arguing that Djilas' primary sin was
his call for the liquidation of the Communist
League (Lustig 1989, 108).
Djilas
emphasized throughout his writings the
necessity of immediately extending
democracy so that socialism could be
achieved. Tito and Kardelj emphatically
rejected that idea because, as they
understood the situation, the government
depended on coercion to maintain its rule
and carry out its social and political
program.
Kardelj went so far as to
announce "We are forced to retain even in
economic relations, let along in political
life, certain elements of coercion in order to
get away from the old and backward ways
as soon as possible." Tito declared that to
extend democracy to the bourgeoisie would
lead "to anarchy, to a terrible uncertainty. .
. . If we permitted this, in a year's time our
Socialist reality would not exist: it would
not exist, I tell you, without a bloody battle"
(Lustig 1989, 108).
These are harsh accusations, yet
Djilas' actions went unchecked for five
years. The reason for the government's
quick condemnation was the change within
the international system. 1954 marked the
year that the system moved from a rigid to
a loose structure. Consequently, the head
governmental leaders forced Djilas from

their ranks only after the international
system had moved from the strict, rigid bipolar system into a loose, changing bi-polar
system.
Until the international system
changed, creating greater insecurity for a
nation in the international arena, critics and
dissenters like Djilas worked with relatively
few constraints. However, once the system
changed, so did the internal politics of the
nation.
b. Greater freedom for change,
including that of the specific governmental
roles was permitted. Since the government
was in a transition mode during this time,
political actors were able to incorporate new
power and influence into their roles.
Especially since the government had just
been established, the nation did not possess
democratic traditions, and neither
superpower truly dominated the country, the
political actors were able to shape their role
with very little effort.
c. A strong, multi-party political
system flourished, although it existed within
the Communist Party.
Originally, this
system was led by two dominant groups, the
theoretical and pragmatists. Within the two
groups were several fractionalized offshoots, as well as multiple ethnicallypowered political groups. This diversity
continued until the government grew
insecure in the international system and
believed that, to remain powerful, it had to
consolidate its power within current leaders.
2. The international system from
1946 to 1948 can be characterized as a loose
multi-polar system since power was shared
by many nations, without domination by a
select one or two countries.
a. The national government followed
stringent domestic policies due to the lack of
international security. During these two
years, the Communist party was unified with
all high-level officials pursuing the same
national agenda.
Critics and dissenters
outside of the "legitimate" government were
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silenced, while those within the government
were either muffled or forgot their criticism
(pavlowitch 1971, 201).
b. The role replaced the individual
in importance, although the individual still
influenced the power associated with the
role. Tito's role as party and governmental
president had set parameters and limitations
which he could not challenge. This is
because his role had direct contact with the
international system and he could not take
the chance of upsetting the system by trying
to expand his power. Once the international
system became more rigid, he had fIrm,
committed international allies so he could
re-defIne his role. However, until this
happened, he had to work within the
constraints of his role.
c. The few high-level governmental
offIcials cemented their control. As a result
of the international insecurity, high-ranking
offIcials moved to close their ranks to
condense all power into their hands. As the
positioned leaders, they had a vested interest
in preserving their power and control so that
the nation would be unifIed and secure
enough to withstand the international
insecurity. This would happen only through
a firm maintenance of control over the
internal scene by the government (Clissold
1983, 201-202).
3.
From 1941 to 1945 the
international system was chaotic since the
World War did not allow any type of
security and the states maintained purely
necessitated alliances. 21
a. The Yugoslavic government was
authoritarian during this time since it had to
unify the country to fight the Germans.
Necessity demanded that any means to expel

the enemy be employed, so human rights
and democratic ideals were not priority
items for the government.
b. Within the resistance movement
itself, which recognized itself as the only
true government, role completely replaced
the individual in importance. This was
because the individual not only feared
international instability, but also national
instability so all actions had to be within the
parameters of their role so that the
government would not suspiciously watch
their every action.
c. Once the resistance leaders seized
power, they were reluctant to share power
with other actors that were not deemed
essential within the governmental
framework. Consequently, few others were
brought into the elite leadership; the small
number of leaders already in power
maintained complete control.
Conclusion

Within the field of foreign policy
analysis, there exists a tremendous gulf
between theory and country expertise.
While many theorists have attempted to
bridge this gulf, few have been successful.
It is imperative that more work be done to
integrate the two sectors of the field because
one does not offer a thorough and viable
explanation without the other. Although the
presented analysis and theory is little more
than an inexperienced attempt to combine
the two sectors, within the presented
information is a cause, an effect and a link
between the two. This is the type of work
which needs to be pursued so that the
inexplicable may become comprehensible.
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NOTES

1. Although he fought against Russia, Tito willingly gave his allegiance to the Russian
Communist movement. He felt no conflict because Tsar Alexander II's capitalistic
government led the country into World War II. So, in effect, Tito fought against an
imperialistic, pro-Western government and not against his brother Communists.
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2. The new government based its power on four sources of legitimacy, which are the
following:
1. Power per se.
2. International recognition and legal continuity with the old Yugoslavia.
3. The Partisan war as the national myth of political founding.
4. Moscow's recognition as the legitimate proletariat protector (Rusinow 1977, 13).
The third source was unique because it was based on the government's own power,
and not on the USSR's power. Ultimately, this power source gave the national government
enough confidence to place its goals and objectives for the state ahead of the world-wide
Communist goals advocated by Stalin.
3. The results of the election showed that 90% of the 74 million Yugoslav voters supported
the single list presented by the People's Front. Although there were no presented opposing
candidates, the voters could vote against the candidate (Rusinow 1977, 12-13).
4. In his book, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison used his organizational process model
to explain how individual actors will create power. The actors will use any means available
to expand their power base, cement their control, and further their role's parameters.
5. During Operation Weiss, and especially in the battle on the Neretva, in early 1943, Tito
rashly changed orders and battle plans. His premature decision to destroy a bridge across the
Neretva substantially impeded and complicated his troops withdrawal, endangering their
survival (Djilas 1980, 12).
6. Djilas, and other officials, often criticized this excessiveness.
7. Djilas' godfather, Mihailo Vickovic, impressed him by the fact that "he was a
Communist because he loved justice, like Christ", something which greatly appealed to his
gentle nature (Lustig 1989, 84).
8. Once Tito declared the Soviet-Yugoslavian separation, he began speaking of a new road
to socialism. He employed democratic rhetoric, praising some Western ideals, while
denouncing Stalinist Communism.
9. This relationship parallels that shared by Nixon and Kissinger throughout the Nixon
administrations. At times it was difficult for policy experts to determine which man was
actually leading the country because of Kissinger's active and dominating presence within
national and international policy making.
10. Part of Graham Allison's organizational process model explains how individual actors,
below the highest officials, will manipulate, change or even fabricate information. This
effectively makes subordinate actors the true policy makers since their agenda is followed
because of presented information.
11. Many would disagree with this statement, but consider the United States' President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his programs created by the New Deal. For the first time,
Americans paid an income tax and collected welfare benefits. Both economic programs must
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be accepted as socialistic in nature.
12. The classic example of this is Germany and the Weimar Republic. While Tito's
government was not necessarily moderate (as defined from a United States' perspective), the
actual national and international policies pursued by the government were indeed moderate,
Even the "shocking" land collectivization programs were not that different from the United
States' distribution of Japanese land during MacArthur's reign.
13. The unification of Yugoslavia was a tremendous task for any government. Especially
when considering the current Yugoslavic situation, it is amazing that any government
managed to unify, and preserve this unity, for more than thirty five years.
14. The pan-Slavic sentiments which helped bring Russia into World War I remained
through this point. Ethnicity transcended geographical lines once calls for Slavic
brotherhood and unity began.
15. Consider the power granted to France compared to her actual capabilities. No
reasonable or logical explanation exists for de Gaulle's equal standing among Roosevelt,
Truman, Stalin, and Churchill. Since the victorious powers, primarily the United States and
Great Britain, voluntarily credited De Gaulle (and others) with power because of anti-fascist
programs during the war, the international power scene was far from reflecting reality.
Partial reality, relative to actual power capabilities, set in only with the commencement of
the bi-polar structure.
16. This new form of communism became a type of socialism intertwined with democracy.
Many other Western European countries grasped some of the Yugoslav-promoted government
ideals and implemented them into their own government. For example, France's quick entry
into socialistic practices can be traced to Yugoslavic influences.
17. B. Sundelius, a country expert theorist, maintains that a nation's memory, i. e. an
inherent memory mechanism which links all national actions together, must be considered
when explaining any type of national action.
18. V. Hudson, et al. theorize that determining a government's primary internal opposition
must occur so that the international system may more clearly understand the conflict. Since
the 1948 conflict was initially viewed as a conflict within the Soviet system, this theory
explains why other nations had to determine whether Tito's insurgent movement was really
valid.
19. Hans Morganthau, as a representative of realism, would offer this explanation of the
conflict.
20. The two superpowers had cemented their alliances by this time and their respective
power and influence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenced in 194849, while the Warsaw Pact was born in 1955. The Marshall Plan had incorporated most of
Western Europe, excluding Eastern Europe at Stalin's insistence. After the United States
"lost" China in 1950, ideology replaced all other issues in importance. Once this happened,
every national government had to pledge complete allegiance to either the United States or
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the USSR. There was no way to remain in both camps.
21. For example, the alliance between Stalin and Hitler was not made for any reason other
than short-term national interest. The same can be said for the relationship between the
Allies and Stalin. Obviously, the wartime system did not contain inherent stability and longterm allies.

-46-

